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Bare Exteriority: 
Philosophy of the Image and the Image of Philosophy in  
Martin Heidegger and Maurice Blanchot 
Emanuel Alloa  
(trans. Millay Hyatt) 
“L’image, la dépouille” 
Blanchot 
I 
Philosophy would henceforth forever be our companion, at day, at 
night, even by losing her name, by becoming literature, scholarship, non-
knowledge, or by standing aside. She would be the unavowable friend in 
whom we respect  love  that which would not permit us to become close 
to her, all the while giving us to believe there is nothing awake in us, noth-
ing vigilant unto sleep, that is not due to her difficult friendship.1 In a late 
text entitled Our Clandestine Companion Maurice Blanchot testifies his at 
once intimate and conflict-ridden relationship to philosophy. If philosophy 
must be considered as Blanchots unavowable, mostly nameless and face-
less companion; Blanchots restrained presence in turn was not less deci-
sive as a dialogue partner for French post-Heideggerian philosophy (Levi-
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nas, Foucault, Derrida, Nancy). In order to apprehend the intricate design 
left by the weaving shuttle going back and forth in this infinite interchange, I 
will focus on what could be the common and nonetheless dividing mem-
brane between them: the question of the image. On the one hand, Blan-
chots theory of the imaginary has recently received particular attention;2 
on the other hand, the question of the image  which has long remained 
external to the main philosophical discourse  could prove to be the very 
thread of Ariadne which leads to the heart of the self-representation of phi-
losophy. In his recent work Au fond des images, Jean-Luc Nancy has es-
tablished that Heideggers critique of Western metaphysics rests on a 
questioning of the status of the image as finitude.3 In this essay I follow the 
intuition that Blanchots writing itself is not only indebted to Heideggers 
thought, but that his reflection on the image reveals striking similarities to 
those of the German philosopher.4 In the following two sections, Heideg-
gers (II) and Blanchots (III) interpretations of the image will be outlined so 
as to bring forth the common motif of their considerations: the image as the 
Latin imago, as the death mask. In the final section of the essay (IV), I shall 
argue that the question of the image thus enables us to approach the bor-
der which both unites and separates Heidegger and Blanchot. This border 
between philosophy and literature, around which the writings of both re-
volve, is the question of exteriority, beyond any representational thinking. 
As I will try to show, however, exteriority is conceived in Heidegger and 
Blanchot in two similar, but nevertheless radically opposed ways: the faint, 
but decisive difference between laying patent (freilegen) and laying bare 
(dépouiller).  
II 
In 1926, Undying Faces, a book of photographs of over a hundred 
death masks of famous personalities from the Renaissance to the First 
World War  from Brunelleschi to Frank Wedekind, from Schiller to Wagner 
and Nietzsche  was published in Berlin by Ernst Benkard.5 The experi-
ence of the massive scale of death in the trenches overshadowed the en-
tire decade of the 1920s, and it is in this decade that a vague desire to en-
dow the phenomenon of death with a meaning transcending its historical 
circumstances came to be expressed. Despite, or precisely as a result, of 
the newly emerging culture of remembrance, expressed in the symbolic 
war memorials erected in small towns all across Germany after the war, 
there was a sense of unease about accepting death as an anonymous fact. 
In the death masks of outstanding historical figures, the wounded Weimar 
Republic not only lent death a singular countenance, but was also able to 
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found a new beginning upon the rubble of the past. Benkards book, which 
by 1935 had gone into its nineteenth printing and had been translated into 
English and other languages, formed only the prelude to a series of publi-
cations  including Richard Langers Totenmasken (Death Masks)6 in the 
following year and especially Egon Friedells famous Das letzte Gesicht 
(The last Face)7 in 1929  whose far-reaching effects on its time are testi-
fied to by numerous writers such as Céline, Canetti, Aragon and Nabokov. 
In Strasbourg in 1926, that same year, Blanchot met the young Em-
manuel Levinas, who would introduce him to the philosophy of Edmund 
Husserl and Martin Heidegger, and with whom he would forge a life-long 
friendship (for Derrida, this friendship was like grace; it remains like a 
blessing of that time,8 a time from which the only verifiable photograph of 
Blanchot remains). In that year thus, Heidegger held a series of lectures in 
Marburg. The way in which he intended to undertake his project of laying 
patent (Freilegung)9 Western philosophy was already beginning to emerge 
in his interpretation of Kant the same year. In the stronghold of Neo-
Kantianism dominating Germany at the time, Heidegger sought to lift the 
epistemological character of philosophy out of its foundations by bringing 
forth from under the epistemological mask that had been forced upon him a 
different Kant. In the second part of the lecture series, Logic: The Essence 
of Truth,10 whose core idea would form the basis of his subsequent book 
on Kant, Heidegger demonstrated how the problem of metaphysics in Kant 
is to be posed, wherein the problem lies, and how the perishing (Ver-
endung) of metaphysics is anticipated in Kantian thought. 
As is well known, Heidegger considers the chapter on schematism, 
held to be an insignificant addendum by Neo-Kantianism, as the connec-
tive hinge not only of the entire structure of the Critique of Pure Reason, 
but of the three Critiques overall. The imagination, which guarantees the 
synthesis of the manifold of perception with the concept of the understand-
ing, is for Heidegger at the same time the anchoring of a metaphysics of 
presence of the re-presented (Vor-gestelltes)  but also the vanishing point 
where temporality constantly postpones the present-at-hand (Vor-
Handenes), and finite Dasein goes beyond itself due to the temporal struc-
ture of the synthesis. The sensation provoked by this radical reinterpreta-
tion during the 1929 Davos dispute with Ernst Cassirer is also well known, 
and Levinas, who was there, gave Blanchot a thorough report upon his re-
turn. For Heidegger, imagination, defined by Kant as exhibitio originaria,11 
precipitates a thinking inseparable from the history of Western metaphysics 
of representation (Vorstellung) adequately produced by a subjectivity to it-
self, but also, as Heidegger argues in Davos, of a presentation [Darstel-
lung], a free giving [Sichgeben].12
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Let us pause for a moment and clarify what is at stake. On the one 
hand, the analysis of the schema-image is to make explicit the essence of 
the metaphysics of presence, as it is constructed on the adequation model 
of truth from within and without. On the other hand, another conception of 
truth is to be brought forth from beneath this structure, which Kants charac-
terisation of imagination as exhibitio originaria literally grasps as original 
self-offering. According to Heidegger, these two opposing conceptions of 
truth  for the question of truth is at the heart of the Marburg lecture series 
 are so entwined in Kant, that they require, first of all, a philosophical her-
meneutics, which Heidegger also renders as the art of outlaying 
(Auslegen). In his laying-patent (freilegend) interpretation, an unknown im-
age emerges from the concept of imagination as the power to represent 
what is already given; an image that was not visible before and now dis-
closes itself of its own accord. This new image of Kant no longer resembles 
him  this is the accusation of the Neo-Kantians. Or is it possible that Kant 
no longer resembles his own image? 
The decisive move in Heideggers interpretation accordingly lies in his 
extraction of the problem of the image from a treatment of the epistemo-
logical capacity: the focus shifts from the problem of representation (Vor-
stellung) to the problem of presentation (Darstellung). In the question of 
presentation, the schema-image has to be understood as a mode of depic-
tion. Heideggers interpretation of Kant was so radical that, as Nancy 
stresses, the example he used to explicate his characterisation of the 
schema-image as depiction was hardly noticed amidst the debate on 
whether his reinterpretation was even admissible or whether it did not ut-
terly distort Kant.13 Instead of making do with an arbitrary example (in other 
contexts he refers to landscapes or photography), Heidegger here cites a 
case that at first glance seems anything but self-evident: A particular mode 
of depiction is also for example the death mask.14  
We have to assume that Heidegger, like most of his contemporaries, 
came across the phenomenon of the death masks for the first time in 
Benkards Undying Faces. The masks stored in the Schiller archive in Mar-
bach are contained in the book, including several authors crucial for Hei-
degger. Not least among these was Nietzsche, although his mask was the 
version reshaped by his sister Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche in an attempt to 
correct the disfigurement caused by his disease. The most lasting impres-
sion on Heidegger seems to have been left by the death mask of Pascal, 
which he cites as a concrete illustration of a death mask. Why employ this 
strange example of a death mask for the problem of presentation as depic-
tion? 
The first answer is obvious. The death mask is constructed by making 
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a physical mould of the face and can thus be seen as an objective adequa-
tion of the dead persons features. By means of this depiction, which itself 
can be depicted, copied or photographed, I can see through the photo-
graph of the depiction directly at that which is primarily represented, that 
which is meant, namely the countenance of the dead person itself, the 
dead man himself.15 The death mask exerts an extraordinary effet de réel, 
which not only causes the observer to look past the material composition 
and perceive what is depicted as something real, but the perishing of 
Dasein itself is verified by the viewers gaze as it imbues the dead with life. 
But what does the death mask really represent? How can it, being tied to 
the most contingent circumstance (the expression a face assumes in the 
instant of death), sum up a persons general aspect or even his personal-
ity? Blaise Pascals death mask seems to have struck many of Benkards 
readers as it demonstrates the domination of the spirit over physical suffer-
ing. Nothing of the intense pain the 39-year old endured is visible in Pas-
cals mask, it has transcended physical contingency and represents faith in 
salvation. Elias Canetti, who discovered Benkards book in Budapest, ob-
serves in his diary in 1927 that the photograph of Pascals death mask is 
not a picture of Pascal, but a picture for something else: Here pain has 
reached its culmination, has found its long sought after meaning. Pain that 
is to remain thought is not capable of more.16 Not the empirically suffering 
Pascal, but the concept of pain is sensualised by the picture. Thanks to a 
dissimilar similarity between a living person and his face frozen in death, 
room is made for a different understanding of the image. Heidegger writes: 
Here a concept of the image appears that differs from the concept of the 
image qua depiction.17 Heidegger is thus able to show how the death 
mask is exemplary in its ability to explain the method of schematism, since 
it appears in a space between empirical sensory diversity and a rational 
unity of concepts.  
The initial anxiety caused by the death mask therefore becomes a tac-
tical element in the argumentative chain of proof and marks its uncanni-
ness. The Pascal example is missing from the Kant book. Is this oversight 
on the part of the thinker of being-toward-death intentional or not? The 
question remains open. The fact is that Heidegger prematurely closes the 
abyss torn open by his example. 
III 
When Heideggers publisher Günther Neske edited a Festschrift on 
the occasion of Heideggers 70th birthday, Blanchot included an excerpt 
from Awaiting Oblivion. From this fragmentary, genre-exploding dialogue, in 
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which Heideggers thought unmistakably shimmers through, Blanchot ex-
tracts a fragment and offers it back to Heidegger like a reflecting prism. Al-
though their motives initially resemble each other, and although Heideg-
gers themes seem recognizable in Blanchots fragment, the text obstructs 
reflection and forces the reader onto another, opaque and image-less sur-
face. The mysterious point around which Awaiting Oblivion revolves is the 
expectation of a revelation, reminding us of Heideggers aletheia, of a truth 
that forges a path across the river of forgetting, across Lethe, out of the 
darkness into the bright light (phos) of the revealed phenomenon (phain-
esthai). But the longer one follows the feverishly recursive writing in Await-
ing Oblivion, the clearer it becomes that the imminent revelation will never 
occur, since it is always imminent. A symbol for this is Lazarus resurrec-
tion, which Blanchot a few years prior had advanced in The Space of Lit-
erature. 
Every reading is a desperate desire for illumination, an attempt to 
bring hidden meaning to light, just as Christ called upon Lazarus: Lazare, 
veni foras, Lazarus, come forth  and knock over your tombstone. To 
knock over the stone seems to be the mission of reading: to make it trans-
parent, to dissolve it with the penetration of the gaze, which, in a burst, 
goes beyond it (EL 257). To read an author would thus mean to move ob-
stacles out of the way (Blanchot refers to excavation), to lay patent 
(freilegen) the path so that it can outlay (auslegen, literally to disclose or 
to interpret) itself. Blanchot seems to approach Heidegger in this thinking of 
the outside, but it is precisely here where he  subtly, but no less radically  
turns away from him. In reading, he writes, there is a vertiginous moment 
that resembles the irrational movement in which we try to open our already 
closed eyes to life (EL 257). The desire to read something that is not there 
to read, to see something that is not there to see, has to be understood as 
the madness of the day. Now the thaumaturgic effect of reading does not, 
according to Blanchot, consist in the least in the cadaveric emptiness be-
ing awakened to life and throwing off its well-woven bands (EL 257), but 
rather in the fact that even after the stone has been pushed aside, the 
grave remains closed, or, like Kafkas gate to the law, has been open all 
along. It is not a mystery that clears itself up but the experience of an im-
penetrable bareness that has always been present. As Blanchot writes in 
the fragment from Awaiting Oblivion: [T]he presence  was, on the con-
trary, stripped of mystery to the point that it laid the mystery bare without 
dis-covering it.18 Not a mystery that reveals itself, but the laying bare of 
absent self-evidence. Blanchot continues elsewhere, such is the character 
proper to this opening that is reading: Only that which is most tightly 
closed opens; only that which is of the greatest opacity is transparent (EL 
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258). The gravestone (sema) is not the sign (sema) for the dead body 
(soma) lying behind it, which comes forth to return to new life and meaning. 
The referential structure of meaning itself is crushed on the naked surface 
of the tombstone. Lazarus does not come outside; he already is the foras, 
the outside, the exteriority of meaning absolved of its finitude. The grave-
stone is no longer a sign of passage, no longer a promise of insight, but a 
radical closure, the closure of the finite. In the mute other, my own potential 
is deprived of power. While in the light of day we may always try to begin 
again, always try to penetrate things once more, we suddenly come up 
against a wall or a face that keeps us in its spell and throws us back on our 
radical passivity: 
If we stare at a face, at a corner of a wall, do we not abandon our-
selves to what we see, are we not at its mercy, without power before 
this strangely mute and passive presence? Its true, but it is because 
what we are staring at has collapsed into its own image, because 
the image has returned to this ground of impotence into which every-
thing relapses. (EL 343) 
Being caught in the fascination of the image is based on the precedence of 
the there is before every I can. The experience of this presence, which 
holds one captive without itself ever being tangible, is the experience of the 
literary. Only because the image deprives doing of its power can we speak 
of literature as the space of images. This is why, at the end of the introduc-
tion to The Space of Literature, Blanchot narrows the question of literature 
to the question of the image  just as Heidegger once narrowed the ques-
tion of the metaphysics of presence to the question of the image. The dif-
ferences however are striking. Where Heidegger saw the creative imagina-
tion as the possibility of rescuing philosophy from The Age of the World 
Picture,19 in which the world has become a mere image, Blanchot demands 
that this reversal in poetic space be even more radical. Where Heidegger 
thinks he hears the setting-to-work of truth in art, Blanchot sees art as the 
experience of errancy. 
What happens to the image in literary language? The notion of the fig-
urativeness of poetic language is easily misunderstood. Poetry does not 
create metaphors or allegories; to be precise, poetry does not, in Blan-
chots view, contain a single image. It is rather the world that has become 
an image in poetry (cf. LV 25). The images of poetic language do not refer 
to any outside, rather they are their own exteriority, an image of the image, 
an image of language (and not a pictorial language), or an imagined 
language, a language no one speaks, that is, a language that 
speaks itself from its own absence, just as the image appears upon 
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the absence of the thing; a language that is directed at the shadow 
of events, not at their reality, by the fact that the words that express 
them are not signs but images, images of words and words in which 
things become images. (EL 32) 
 But does one not run the risk when making language into its own image of 
repeating the old notion that the image comes after the thing? The ap-
pendix to The Space of Literature entitled Two Versions of the Imaginary 
takes up this problem: After signifies that the thing has to distance itself 
before it can be seized again (EL 343). By insisting on the becoming-
image of the thing, Blanchot continues Heideggers notion of the distance 
that undermines the stans of standing face-to-face. But for Heidegger the 
distance (Entfernung) is temporary, since it is always already Ent-Fernung, 
the abolition of distance (Ferne). For Blanchot on the other hand, distance 
is here at the heart of the matter (EL 343). The thing that we seize in the 
living movement of a performance of comprehension is, by virtue of be-
coming an image, made into the unseizable, the inactual, the impassive, 
not the same thing at a distance but that thing as distance (EL 343). The 
image is not a living representative of something momentarily absent, but a 
recurrence of that which does not return (EL 343). Elsewhere Blanchot 
makes use of Bachelards distinction (borrowed from Minkowski) between 
the resonance and the resounding of the image:20 The image can never be 
an echo of what is known (resonance), but on the contrary effects a step-
ping outside of itself (resounding) (EI 470). Against this background it be-
comes clear why Blanchot gives as an example of his concept of the image 
something that is considerably removed from the way it is commonly un-
derstood. It is an example that strongly reminds us of Heidegger. 
 The image, the bare corpse (EL 343)  the image is the corpse (la 
dépouille), bared (dépouillé). The corpse is not an image Blanchot intro-
duces in order to illustrate his concept, rather his example undoes the un-
derstanding of the image itself: The image, at first glance, does not re-
semble the cadaver, but it could be that the cadaveric strangeness is also 
that of the image (EL 344). The experience is uncanny as, literally, the 
suspension of the familiar. The dead person is there and at the same time 
neither down here nor up there, neither here nor anywhere else: The ca-
daveric presence establishes a relation between here and nowhere (EL 
344). While the sight of the corpse de-places the viewer, the corpse re-
mains irrevocably here. Only grudgingly is the corpse moved somewhere 
else; the dead person monopolizes the space, and fills it with his absence. 
Although the corpse has approached the condition of a thing as much as 
possible  it is spread out on the death bed, prepared  and although the 
dead person has become pure passivity, he seems to have absolute free-
░    Bare Exteriority 77 
dom of movement and the ability to paralyse the power of the living. At the 
site of death all everyday activities cease. Just as a damaged tool becomes 
an image of itself because it no longer disappears into utility and thus can 
appear as itself for the first time, so the dead person is an image of himself 
 an image in which the impossibility-of-work (désoeuvrement) of the image 
appears. The appearance of the damaged (abîmé) is unbearable because 
it tears open an abyss (abîme): Behind the appearance there is nothing left 
to hark back to. One cannot tarry in the bare exteriority of the damaged 
one, but every promise of a place beyond it is denied. The corpse troubles 
the home (la demeure), because to remain (demeurer) in the abode is no 
longer permitted. The corpse is uncanny since the dead has no place; the 
appearance of the dead is a visitation (Heimsuchung), and no here can be 
a home any longer. Blanchot writes: the cadaver may be peacefully laying 
in state, but it is still everywhere in the room and in the house (EL 348), 
just as in Poes The Fall of the House of Usher,21 where the dead roams 
around, takes away the breath of the living and condemns the house to 
ruin. Unable to remain in its own place, the cadaver is errant (irrt). Every-
thing about the corpse is restless, wandering (irrend), erroneous (irrig). The 
concept of errancy (Irre) is shared by both Blanchot and Heidegger. Hei-
degger employs it in Of the Essence of Truth in order to emphasize that the 
search for truth always implies a wandering (Irren) in error (Irrtum).22 Blan-
chot on the other hand raises erring to the truth of the image, to the truth of 
literature. Literature does not create a place for us to stay, instead we al-
ways find ourselves on its shores, at its edge. 
The sight of the corpse breaks through the relation of similarity  I 
cannot recognize the deceased in that frozen, mask-like face. Paradoxically 
however, the deceased returns at the very moment the interpersonal rela-
tionship is severed, and begins to resemble himself (EL 346). But is him-
self not the wrong expression? Would it not be better to say similar to who 
he was while alive? Yet Blanchot means exactly what he says. Not until 
the dead person becomes an impersonal, anonymous neuter does he 
come to resemble himself. At the moment the self resembles itself, it 
moves into the dangerous zone of the neuter, where it is lost (verirrt) in it-
self like its own spirit, a ghost, a revenant that survives itself and only con-
tinues to have an effect in its own return.23 The perishing of human exis-
tence, bared in the corpse, thus does not mark an existential caesura, but a 
continuous postponement of the end. Against certain contemporary phi-
losophies (by this designation Blanchot always means Heidegger), which 
see in the finitude of existence the possibility of understanding and the self-
resolution of truth  as if the choice between death as the possibility of un-
derstanding and death as the horror of impossibility also had to be the 
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choice between sterile truth and the verbosity of the non-true (EL 351)  
death for Blanchot is never the end, but rather the impossibility of the end 
and thus of all resolution. Death is unavoidable and yet unapproachable, 
in the face of death I do not die, I am deprived of the power of dying, in 
death one dies and one does not cease dying (EL 202). Death constantly 
remains something external without ever becoming an authentic experi-
ence. The image would then be another name for exteriority, and exteriority 
another name for the image. 
IV 
Wherein then does the image as exteriority differ from Heideggers 
concept of the image? In Heideggers analyses of Kant, his decisive move 
is to oppose the metaphysics of presence, which culminates in the repre-
sentation for a self (or a representation of a self for itself), with the tempo-
rality of the imagination. (The Kant book, which combines the temporal di-
mension of Dasein with the hermeneutics of the historical tradition, should 
therefore not be seen as a preparatory work to Being and Time, but as the 
announced but never completed second part of the magnum opus). The 
example of the death mask allows Heidegger to break through the notion of 
adequation, according to which the representation resembles the repre-
sented. The countenance of the dead person reveals something irretrieva-
bly distant, which is nevertheless given to me. The structure of this self-
engendering (sichzeitigenden) giving is essentially a temporal structure, 
diametrically opposed to the immediacy of the present. From something is 
present [to me] to something is given (es gibt), Heidegger transforms 
egology into a phenomenology of anonymously appearing being. That 
which is hidden and distant actually becomes present with the event of 
givenness (es gibt), in that the event is not only current events but an ac-
tual en-owning (Er-eignis). At the sight of the death mask, Dasein comes 
into itself as finite existence. 
At first glance, Blanchot seems to revert to the metaphysics of pres-
ence castigated by Heidegger. Nothing appears on the countenance of the 
dead person; it rather represents the end of every appearance and the re-
turn to the irrevocable immanence of a naked presence. The presence 
Blanchot is aiming at however hardly resembles the traditional idea of rep-
resentation: It is not a presence a subject has at his disposal because he 
produced it himself (pro ducere, to place in front of oneself), but nor is it a 
Heideggerian coming-into-the-present of a distance as the here and now of 
a given. In Blanchots writing nothing is ever given, there persists rather 
something like an insistence of un-giveability. The corpse is not given, but 
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im-mediate in that it cannot appear as a medium. 
No one has more thoroughly gauged the profound rift that divides the 
 in many ways akin  figures of Heidegger and Blanchot, than the person 
who himself always stood between the two: Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas 
was able to show that Heidegger and Blanchot first differ in the position 
they each give to exteriority. Heidegger discovered that with an issue ex-
ternal to the classical philosophical discourse (the problem of the image) 
he was able to unhinge the Western tradition. If representation is based on 
immediacy, then the event of giving introduces a constitutive distance into 
thinking. Except that Heideggers thinking, as subversive as it appears, re-
mains for Levinas subject to a thinking of domination. The appearance, as 
distant as it may be, as much as it removes me from myself, remains an 
appearance for me: By appearing, the most foreign stranger, the strangest 
thing, already gives power something to hold onto, and submits itself to 
me.24 Despite all its distance, Heideggers thinking remains a thinking of 
staying. 
Blanchot on the other hand does not remove exteriority to an else-
where, but withdraws it from any localizability. This is why Levinas sees 
Blanchot as the thinker of the nomadic par excellence, for whom literature 
is less an exile than an exhibition of mans basic disposition in an exiled ex-
istence. The Heideggerian universe, which remains a foundational think-
ing regardless of the late Heideggers assertions, becomes uprooted in 
Blanchot.25 What is left is a nomadic, placeless sojourn in the desert, a 
sojourning where the difference between night and day becomes blurred. 
The literary work does not dis-cover the truth, but on the contrary lays bare 
an essential darkness, the darkness of errancy. As Blanchot writes, before 
the obscurity of which art reminds us, just as before death, the I as the 
support of power dissolves into an anonymous one on an earth of peregri-
nation.26 This exteriority, into which the reader is abducted, is no longer 
the reverse of an inside; it is not a night that belongs to and follows upon a 
day, but a second night (EL 220-4), totally detached from any illumination. 
In this second night  the space of the second death and of the corpses 
double  truth no longer develops in the dark, rather the darkness itself 
turns out to be that which no longer shines. Michel Foucault, who first 
summed up Blanchots writing as a thought of the outside, also read this 
movement as a disempowerment of the classical thinking of the image. The 
thought of the outside must no longer be a power that tirelessly produces 
images and makes them shine, but rather a power that undoes them, that 
lessens their overload.27  
Heidegger and Blanchots diagnoses would thus initially seem to be 
related (denunciations of an age of the depicting world image), but their 
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proposals turn out to be antinomically opposed. In that very year in which 
Blanchot adjoins a fragment from Awaiting Oblivion to Heideggers Fest-
schrift, he publishes the article The End of Philosophy in the Nouvelle Re-
vue Française.28 Every movement of transgression necessarily hyposta-
tizes what it tries to overcome, missing real exteriority. Transcending meta-
physics thus becomes a movement of its preservation. The truth is: we 
dont want to lose anything.29 In such a perspective, Heidegger is the last 
representative of such a preserving thought. The discovery of the death 
masks became for Heidegger a starting point from which to bring forth an 
unseen life from under the frozen image of the past. Blanchot on the other 
hand strove to reach the point at which all image production, all imagination 
is brought to a stop.  
In Benkards book, Heidegger is struck by Pascals death mask, in 
which perception separates itself from similarity in order to move closer to 
the concept (of fear, of pain). Blanchot, on the other hand, is riveted by the 
death mask with which Benkard concludes his book: the only anonymous 
mask, of a young girl drowned in the Seine, the so-called Unknown Girl 
from the Seine. In one of his last writings Blanchot mentions that he had 
hanging over his desk in Èze in the south of France this photograph of the 
impersonal and yet so immediately moving countenance of death.30 The 
unknown girl reflects neither the universal concept nor any personal indi-
viduality into Blanchots writing of the blank neuter, this neuter Blanchot 
had discovered in his university thesis on the philosophy of the sceptics. In 
ancient scepticism, the equivalence (isosthenia) of the forces leads to the 
zero-point of neither-nor (ne…uter), in which the forces neutralize each 
other and can neither be said (dire) nor contradicted (contredire). All that is 
left is destitution (dédire) of discourse itself. 
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